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ACCEPTING CONTESTED MEANINGS 
Bernadette Meyler* 
INTRODUCTION 
One claim that has both fueled originalism and spawned multiple 
objections to its very possibility is the contention that, if original meaning is 
to retain any significance at all in the present, it must be determinate.  
Without determinacy, some argue, originalism cannot solve the problem 
that it was aimed at addressing:  the so-called “countermajoritarian 
difficulty,” or the notion that judicial review functions as an undemocratic 
element within the U.S. political system because it permits unelected judges 
to controvert the will of legislative majorities.  And yet, as many have 
pointed out, ascertaining determinate meanings often proves to be an 
elusive goal within the constitutional context.  This problem is rendered 
even more pronounced when one takes into account what I have tried to 
identify elsewhere as the contested meanings of common law clauses within 
the Constitution.1  These phrases often sound like terms of art, which a 
reader or ratifier might assume possessed a specialized meaning within the 
legal community.  The practices of legal communities differed among the 
colonies and states and even within them.  Legal actors themselves 
recognized local and English variants of these practices.  Rather than simply 
accepting what appears to have been the majority interpretation of such 
common law terms, throwing one’s hands up in despair, or moving 
immediately to constitutional construction in light of the interpretive 
situation, I contend here that we should uncover these disparate meanings 
and perform our contemporary interpretations of constitutional clauses in 
ways that resonate with them. 
Over the past few decades, originalist theories of constitutional 
interpretation have arguably presented the most compelling solution to what 
Alexander Bickel identified in 1962 as the “counter-majoritarian 
difficulty.”2  As Bickel eloquently stated the relevant problem: 
 
*  Professor of Law and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School.  I am 
grateful to Matthew Smith, Aziz Rana, Mike Dorf, Larry Solum, and Will Partlett, as well as 
participants in The New Originalism in Constitutional Law Symposium at Fordham 
University School of Law for comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
 1. See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 551 (2006) (elaborating historically and theoretically upon the variety of common law 
glosses available for a number of constitutional provisions). 
 2. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
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[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in 
democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be 
denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions, born of 
the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system.  
Judicial review works counter to this characteristic.3 
Originalists have attempted to solve the difficulty by insisting that judges 
are not simply imposing their own elite views of what the Constitution 
should mean or what rights should look like upon a reluctant populace who 
would prefer a different politics, but instead are enforcing an agreement that 
commands the support of “the people” or, at least, of a supermajority, and 
that, therefore, should outweigh majoritarian expediencies in the present. 
Phrased in these general terms, originalism has commanded the 
allegiance of both liberals like Bruce Ackerman and conservatives like 
Justice Antonin Scalia.  One of the principal differences between the camps 
as represented by Ackerman and Justice Scalia consists in the account of 
when change has occurred at the level of the Constitution; whereas Justice 
Scalia would always—at least in principle—look back to the moment of the 
Founding or the time of ratification of a constitutional amendment, 
Ackerman insists that periods like the New Deal allow for extratextual 
constitutional amendment by a plebiscitary president and his influence on 
the judiciary.4  In creating a typology of liberal responses to the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, Nimer Sultany recently divided the 
possibilities into two general camps—those characterized by a “Discourse 
of Unity” and those typified by a “Discourse of Disunity.”5  Included within 
the “Discourse of Unity” are both “denial” (of a “tension between 
constitutionalism and democracy”) and “reconciliation” (of the tension, 
resulting in a justification of judicial review).6  Originalists of the various 
stripes all fall within the discourse of unity, whether, as Sultany attributes to 
Ackerman,7 denying the tension, or, extending Sultany’s argument, 
attempting to achieve reconciliation, like Justice Scalia. 
For many originalists, asserting the determinacy of constitutional 
meaning has been crucial to denying or reconciling the potential tension 
between constitutionalism and democracy.  According to this 
understanding, unelected judges are authorized to cabin or annul the will of 
political representatives as expressed in legislative or executive branch 
action only by recourse to a text that, when interpreted correctly—or, in 
other words, when employing the proper procedures—states a determinate 
constraint articulated by the Founding or amending generation.  To the 
 
 3. Id. at 19. 
 4. Contrast, for example, the theoretical account of originalism provided by Justice 
Scalia in Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997), with Bruce Ackerman’s vision of constitutional change as 
expressed in BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 3–33 (1991). 
 5. Nimer Sultany, The State of Progressive Constitutional Theory:  The Paradox of 
Constitutional Democracy and the Project of Political Justification, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 371, 377 (2012). 
 6. Id. at 377. 
 7. Id. at 377, 399–402. 
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extent that ambiguity or uncertainty remains upon application of the right 
interpretive principles, these originalists argue that courts should not 
intervene and should instead let political determinations lie.  By contrast, a 
number of those falling within the “New Originalist” camp instead 
acknowledge that the meaning of much constitutional text cannot be 
definitively resolved from an originalist perspective.8 
The recommendation of these scholars is not, however, to dwell on the 
various meanings recoverable in light of originalist interpretation but 
instead to resort to some form of what Keith Whittington has called 
“construction”—whether by judges or by actors in the political branches—
in developing an account of how the Constitution should apply in the 
present.9  These writers hence advocate turning to current politics once 
confronted with the possibility of constitutional indeterminacy.  As this 
Symposium Article contends, the move from the indeterminacy of original 
meaning straight to contemporary construction is satisfactory neither as an 
account of interpretation nor as a matter of democracy. 
Many originalists have, so far, taken one of the premises of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty for granted—the notion that the majoritarian 
electoral process should constitute the dominant means of securing 
democracy within our system, as within any democratic system.  To the 
extent that figures like Ackerman or, more recently, Michael Rappaport and 
 
 8. Several accounts have been given of what constitutes “the New Originalism” or, 
more broadly, “New Originalisms.”  James Fleming has recently observed that Keith 
Whittington, Lawrence Solum, and even Justice Scalia, Ronald Dworkin, and Jack Balkin 
have characterized themselves or been characterized as New Originalists.  Under such a 
broad definition, he argues, “new originalism . . . is a family of theories, not one unified 
view.” James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now?  I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785, 
1788–94 (2013) (quotation marks omitted). 
  Despite the diversity of scholars and approaches, some have attempted to furnish a 
concrete set of criteria for recognizing New Originalism.  Hence, Lawrence Solum suggests 
that New Originalists adhere to four theses, the second and fourth of which do not apply to 
other kinds of originalists: 
 The fixation thesis:  The linguistic meaning of the constitutional text was 
fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified.   
 The public meaning thesis:  Constitutional meaning is fixed by the 
understanding of the words and phrases and the grammar and syntax that 
characterized the linguistic practices of the public and not by the intentions of 
the framers.   
 The textual constraint thesis:  The original meaning of the text of the 
Constitution has legal force:  the text is law and not a mere symbol.   
 The interpretation-construction distinction:  Constitutional practice includes 
two distinct activities:  (1) constitutional interpretation, which discerns the 
linguistic meaning of the text, and (2) constitutional construction, which 
determines the legal effect of the text. 
Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. 
SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  A DEBATE 1, 4 (2011).  Similarly distinguishing 
new from old originalism, Keith Whittington has claimed that “the new originalism . . . is 
more concerned with providing the basis for positive constitutional doctrine than the basis 
for subverting doctrine,” that it “is less likely to emphasize a primary commitment to judicial 
restraint,” and that it “is focused less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters of 
constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that was adopted.” Keith E. 
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 608–09 (2004). 
 9. See infra notes 20–21, 34–39 and accompanying text. 
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John McGinnis have suggested that the role of the Constitution in our 
system demonstrates the purchase of a different democratic vision, they 
have relied on the notion that constitutional settlements entail the 
concurrence of a broader constituency than ordinary legislation, and, hence, 
should be deferred to in cases of conflict.10  This kind of “dualist 
democracy,” as Ackerman has called it, juxtaposes the time of regular 
politics with the exceptional moments when constitutions or constitutional 
changes are produced.11 
The focus in extant originalist accounts on majoritarianism and more 
unified conceptions of “the people” or supermajorities is, this Article 
argues, misguided.  Not only does it underestimate the role of political 
dissensus within the governmental system that the Constitution itself 
establishes—as witnessed by the distribution of powers and capabilities 
among a broad range of constitutional actors—but it also forces originalists 
to ignore or work around the substantial disagreements among the members 
of the Founding generation.  These disagreements pertained not simply to 
questions that the Constitution ultimately resolved, but rather to the very 
meaning of constitutional terms.  Taking seriously the challenge to 
justifications of originalism posed by dissensus, one can reconstruct the 
value of originalism as a domain of contested meanings—contested not 
simply as a matter of present democracy, but also as a function of a 
democracy that has endured and possesses awareness of its own 
temporality, the possibility of which is precisely what critics of democracy 
from Athens onward have denied. 
Some might argue that, even if it were democratically desirable to accept 
the contested meanings of constitutional terms, such contested meanings do 
not, as a matter of interpretation, constitute meanings at all.  Hence, Stanley 
Fish’s recent work contends that original meaning originalism carries no 
meaning at all, because meaning derives only from intentional 
communications by authors.12  Were the Constitution to be discovered 
millennia in the future and thought to have been created by a random set of 
typographical accidents, the possible interpreters would be correct to treat it 
as simply nonsense rather than as a potential carrier of meaning.  Fish 
concludes from this that the Constitution can only mean what it was 
intended to mean—although he also specifies that this theoretical 
conclusion says nothing about how one should go about discerning that 
intent.  Even accepting the priority Fish places on original intent, however, 
one can justify interpreting the Constitution as a document of contested 
signification.  There is nothing about meaning that requires it to be unitary 
to exist. 
 
 10. See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 3–33. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael 
B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693 (2010) (arguing 
that the supermajoritarian process of constitutional creation led to many of the virtues of the 
U.S. Constitution). 
 11. ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 3–33. 
 12. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
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In Part I, this Article articulates the role of determinacy in originalism as 
it has been practiced.  Part II turns to the democratic justifications for 
focusing on the disparate meanings furnished by the common law backdrop 
of the Constitution.  Part III then defends the interpretive proposition that 
constitutional clauses can maintain multiple meanings. 
I.  DETERMINACY IN ORIGINALISM 
The significance of an originalist insistence on determinacy can be 
gleaned from the contrast between Justice Kennedy’s opinion, writing for 
the Court, in the 2008 habeas corpus case of Boumediene v. Bush13 and 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in that same case.  The decision arose from 
challenges to the Military Commissions Act’s attempt to remove the 
pending habeas corpus cases of aliens detained as enemy combatants from 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.14  The Court determined that the 
petitioners, Guantánamo Bay detainees, could assert a right under the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution against this provision of the Military 
Commissions Act,15 despite the fact that the Founding-era history of habeas 
corpus could not definitively answer the question of whether the writ would 
have extended to Guantánamo Bay under the common law.16  Part of the 
resolution of the case thus depended on the justices’ decision about how to 
treat conflicting and sometimes absent common law evidence.  According 
to Justice Kennedy, 
[The] arguments [of both the petitioners and the Government] are 
premised . . . upon the assumption that the historical record is complete 
and that the common law, if properly understood, yields a definite answer 
to the questions before us.  There are reasons to doubt both assumptions.  
Recent scholarship points to the inherent shortcomings in the historical 
record.  And given the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and the 
particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age, the common-law courts 
simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels to this one.  
We decline, therefore, to infer too much, one way or the other, from the 
lack of historical evidence on point.17 
Although Justice Kennedy here points to the lack of historical 
documentation and the fact that exact parallels to contemporary 
circumstances might not have been present in the Founding era, his 
comments could equally apply to situations in which the common law 
evidence of various relevant jurisdictions cut in different directions.  In that 
case as well, Justice Kennedy might have insisted that the lack of 
determinacy in the historical evidence should not itself be outcome 
determinative. 
Because he concludes that the common law record is insufficient to 
establish a determinate eighteenth-century understanding of the reach of 
 
 13. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 14. Id. at 732–33, 735–37. 
 15. Id. at 771. 
 16. Id. at 752. 
 17. Id. (citation omitted). 
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habeas corpus to territories analogous to Guantánamo Bay, Justice 
Kennedy’s lengthy review of the historical scope of habeas corpus carries 
few implications for the ultimate test he establishes in Boumediene.  
Instead, he invokes the U.S. Supreme Court’s own prior precedents—
including, most prominently, Johnson v. Eisentrager,18 a case involving 
German war criminals held in a prison that the United States administered 
in Germany—to generate a set of factors that should be weighed in deciding 
whether the writ of habeas corpus runs to any particular location.19 
This method appears consistent with a New Originalist norm of 
constitutional construction.  As Keith Whittington explains it, construction 
takes up where interpretation leaves off:  “Constructions do not pursue a 
preexisting if deeply hidden meaning in the founding document; rather, they 
elucidate the text in the interstices of discoverable, interpretive meaning, 
where the text is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of 
faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.”20  In the face of the 
indeterminacy of the results of interpretation, construction fills in the 
gaps.21  Similarly, under Justice Kennedy’s view in Boumediene, the 
indefiniteness of the answer that the common law yields to the question of 
the scope of the writ of habeas corpus requires turning to other sources and 
other modes of reasoning to generate factors for constitutional analysis. 
By contrast, Justice Scalia insists in Boumediene upon an 
unreconstructed version of originalism, one opposed to any claims for the 
role of constitutional construction—at least as practiced by the judiciary.  
Responding to the majority’s arguments about the weight of history, Justice 
Scalia maintains: 
In light of [the] principles of deference [to Congress’s view that a law it 
has passed is constitutional], the Court’s conclusion that ‘the common law 
[does not] yiel[d] a definite answer to the questions before us,’ leaves it 
no choice but to affirm the Court of Appeals.  The writ as preserved in the 
Constitution could not possibly extend farther than the common law 
provided when that Clause was written.  The Court admits that it cannot 
determine whether the writ historically extended to aliens held abroad, 
and it concedes (necessarily) that Guantanamo Bay lies outside the 
sovereign territory of the United States.  Together, these two concessions 
establish that it is (in the Court’s view) perfectly ambiguous whether the 
common-law writ would have provided a remedy for these petitioners.  If 
that is so, the Court has no basis to strike down the Military Commissions 
Act, and must leave undisturbed the considered judgment of the co-equal 
branches.22 
 
 18. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 19. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
 20. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:  DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5 (1999). 
 21. Notably, under Whittington’s account, it is largely the political branches, not the 
courts, that engage in construction. See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.  Other 
theories like Jack Balkin’s that rely on the interpretation-construction distinction, however, 
allow for a larger judicial role in the process of construction. 
 22. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 832–33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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Although Justice Scalia refers to the Court’s customary principles of 
deference to Congress, it is a short step from here to the notion he has 
frequently reiterated that the Court must defer to the elected branches when 
the Constitution does not dictate a contrary result.  Hence, in any cases of 
constitutional ambiguity, Congress’s judgment should supplant the Court’s.  
If, for Justice Kennedy, the fact that the common law of the Founding era 
did not dictate constitutional meaning meant that constitutional construction 
could take over, for Justice Scalia, it suggested that the Constitution’s role 
in the matter—at least as judicially implemented—was at an end.  Although 
the political branches might legitimately engage in constitutional 
construction, such an act is precisely that which judges must 
conscientiously avoid when interpreting the Constitution. 
This conclusion flows inevitably from the significance of the role of 
originalism as a constraint on judges in Justice Scalia’s interpretive theory.  
As Jack Balkin has summarized this position, dubbing it “skyscraper 
originalism,” “skyscraper originalism views following correct interpretive 
methodology as the central constraint on judges,” neglecting the possible 
role of other institutional constraints.23  The vision of originalism as 
restraining otherwise rampant judicial overreaching is rooted in the 
countermajoritarian difficulty.  As Barry Friedman’s apt title of one part of 
his history of the countermajoritarian difficulty—The Birth of an Academic 
Obsession24—suggests, the quandary has preoccupied constitutional 
theorists at least for the fifty years since Alexander Bickel’s formulation of 
the problem in 1962 in The Least Dangerous Branch (which had its fiftieth 
anniversary just last year).25  Of course, many brilliant efforts have 
attempted to resolve the difficulty.  Two approaches are of particular 
interest here. 
First, in We the People, Bruce Ackerman indicates a particular value of 
the Constitution for democracy rather than simply for the liberal articulation 
of rights.26  According to his dualist theory of democracy, higher law is 
created during particular periods or constitutional moments—including the 
Founding era, Reconstruction, and the New Deal—and must be preserved 
from the incursions of temporary legislative majorities during the 
intervening eras.  This higher law is not imposed by fiat from above, but is 
posited by the people themselves.  It is the role of the courts to maintain the 
principles of higher law during the eras intervening between constitutional 
moments.  Hence the judiciary protects the will of “the people” against the 
views of transient majorities.27 
 
 23. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 22 (2011). 
 24. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession:  The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
 25. BICKEL, supra note 2. 
 26. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 4. 
 27. Michael Rappaport and John McGinnis’s arguments in favor of construing the 
Constitution as enshrining a preference for supermajorities can be read as another variant on 
the dualist democracy theme.  Although they have written extensively about this idea, they 
encapsulate it most succinctly in Our Supermajoritarian Constitution: 
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Second, for Justice Stephen Breyer, the courts not only help to serve 
democracy by deferring to the political branches but can also democratize 
themselves.  As he writes in the introduction to Active Liberty:  Interpreting 
Our Democratic Constitution, 
[M]y thesis . . . finds in the Constitution’s democratic objective not 
simply restraint on judicial power or an ancient counterpart of more 
modern protection, but also a source of judicial authority and an 
interpretive aid to more effective protection of ancient and modern liberty 
alike. . . .  [I]ncreased emphasis upon that [democratic] objective by 
judges when they interpret a legal text will yield better law.28 
Under this view, judges implement democracy not simply by enforcing 
constitutional meaning, but by attempting to actualize the democratic 
decisionmaking of the contemporary moment. 
These two approaches represent two poles of justification for judicial 
review in the face of the countermajoritarian difficulty.  One argument 
insists upon the democratic credentials of the Constitution itself, and, in a 
derivative sense, of the judiciary reviewing political branch actions for 
constitutionality.  The other makes an implicit or explicit claim that the 
legitimacy of the Constitution rests in the hands of present citizens who 
accept it, and maintains, therefore, that judges should espouse a living 
constitutionalism that gives shape to a more contemporary democratic 
vision. 
There are significant problems, I would contend, with both of these 
approaches.  With respect to the former, the Ackermanian vision of “we the 
people” resonates with the heritage of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and his 
invocation of the “general will.”29  If we interpret Ackerman’s account of 
the Constitution as a version in miniature of Rousseau’s argument about 
 
  This Article proposes a new theory of the Constitution.  We argue that the 
central principle underlying the Constitution is governance through supermajority 
rules.  More specifically, the Constitution embraces supermajority rules as a means 
of improving legislative decisionmaking in various circumstances where majority 
rule would operate poorly.  Supermajoritarianism is thus a means of promoting the 
more general constitutional principle of republicanism, which attempts to promote 
the public good within a system of popular representation.  The super-majoritarian 
principle is central both to an accurate description of the Constitution and to the 
proper understanding of the normative reasons why the Constitution binds us. 
John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. L. 
REV. 703, 705 (2002).  This article points to supermajoritarian aspects of the creation and 
ratification of the Constitution (including the fact that twelve of the thirteen states supported 
convening a constitutional convention and that nine of the thirteen were obliged to approve 
the Constitution before it went into effect), the inclusion of supermajority requirements in 
various constitutional clauses, and the stringent constraints on constitutional amendment. Id. 
at 705, 709, 710–17, 780–90. 
 28. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:  INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
6 (2005). 
 29. Rousseau’s classic formulation of the “general will” in The Social Contract 
explicitly subordinates majoritarianism to consensus.  As Rousseau writes, “The law of 
majority rule is itself something established by convention, and presupposes unanimity at 
least once.” JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Of the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND 
OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 49 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., 1997) (1762).  
For Ackerman’s indebtedness to Rousseau, see Sultany, supra note 5, at 399–401. 
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entrance into the social compact, we can see the American individual as, 
like the Rousseauvian citizen (in Daniel Bensaïd’s gloss), “put[ting] his 
person ‘under the supreme direction of the general will,’” and “becom[ing] 
‘an indivisible part of the whole.’”30  “The cost,” as Daniel Bensaïd has 
claimed, of this model “is an exacerbated holism.”31  By imagining that we 
are part of “the people,” we are forced to live out a fiction that may be 
useful when it comes to the justifications for entering into society but less 
helpful when it pertains to following the Constitution. 
With respect to the latter, it may furnish a perfectly fine model for 
judging, but it does not account for the role of the Constitution within our 
political scheme, apart from its capacity to indicate certain values of liberty 
that we could also glean from almost any other modern legal document.  
Even one of the most thoroughgoing proponents of living constitutionalism, 
David Strauss, does not defend this position fully.  Instead, when 
advocating for applying a common law interpretive model in the area of 
constitutional interpretation, he refutes the contention that the common law 
method is undemocratic by instead claiming that it is the Constitution itself 
that is undemocratic because it will and should sometimes thwart 
majorities.32  Here the problem rests not in the conception of the people as a 
fictional unity but instead in the vision of democracy as exclusively 
connoting the rule of majorities within the present. 
If the forms of originalism advocated by figures as disparate as Justice 
Scalia and Ackerman rely on the notion that the special democratic origins 
of the Constitution legitimize the constraints that it imposes on the 
statutorily expressed will of legislative majorities, the corollary for at least 
some originalists is that this legitimacy ends once the meaning of particular 
constitutional clauses becomes demonstrably less than certain.  Justice 
Scalia himself has perhaps most clearly propounded this position in cases 
like Boumediene and others.  In light of the ambiguity of common law 
meanings, Justice Scalia generally advocates adopting what he deems the 
dominant view in the states at the time of the Founding, if such a dominant 
view can be discerned.  For example, in the Confrontation Clause case of 
Crawford v. Washington, he distinguished most of the Founding-era 
evidence Chief Justice William Rehnquist had furnished contrary to Justice 
Scalia’s own position on the original meaning of the provision and claimed, 
“The only timely authority the Chief Justice cites . . . provides no 
substantial support.”33  If no determinate meaning seems forthcoming, as in 
Boumediene, Justice Scalia indicates that decisionmaking should be left to 
the political branches. 
New Originalists instead place more weight both on the possibility that 
the Constitution might not be as determinate as Justice Scalia often 
contends, and on the mechanisms for implementing the Constitution in light 
 
 30. Daniel Bensaïd, Permanent Scandal, in DEMOCRACY IN WHAT STATE? 16, 28 (Amy 
Allen ed., William McCuaig trans., 2011). 
 31. Id. at 29. 
 32. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 47 (2010). 
 33. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 n.5 (2004) (citations omitted). 
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of this lack of fixity.  As Keith Whittington explains towards the end of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 
If originalism is theoretically possible, and in fact required to ground the 
practice of judicial review, it remains practically difficult.  As critics have 
pointed out, the record of the founders’ intent is less extensive and clear 
than might be desired.  Although the broad outlines of the constitutional 
meaning may be reasonably clear, interpretation of the text often falls 
short of providing clear guidance in making the fine distinctions required 
to settle contemporary disputes. . . .  In such cases, the founders could 
reasonably be said to have no intent relevant to a given question, and thus 
constitutional law has no determinate answer to provide.34 
In responding to this situation, Whittington insists both that it means 
interpretation is at an end, and that the Constitution still remains relevant 
through the “political constitution,” which “requires a process of 
construction to add to the text to realize its suggested meaning.”35 
According to Whittington’s vision, “It is a necessary and essential 
political task, regardless of the particular institution exercising that 
function, to construct a determinate constitutional meaning to guide 
government practice.”36  Significantly, the moments he addresses in 
Constitutional Construction relied on the political branches to effectuate 
constitutional change rather than on the judiciary.  As he writes of the 
episodes he discusses, “these constructions did not depend on judicial 
review for their enforcement.  They altered constitutional practices but 
barely affected judicial doctrine.”37  Recently, Jack Balkin has brought 
construction squarely back into judicial decisionmaking in Living 
Originalism.  As Balkin claims, “[T]he processes of constitutional change 
are primarily the work of constitutional construction, involving both the 
political branches and the courts. . . .  It is a ‘democratic constitutionalism,’ 
to use Post and Siegel’s expression, because constitutional doctrine is 
responsive, over time, to a wide variety of political and cultural forces.”38  
In particular, under a living originalist account, judicial interpretations of 
the Constitution respond to the pressure of social movements; hence, “[t]he 
system of living constitutionalism . . . maintains the benefits of 
 
 34. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 211 (1999). 
 35. Id.  Whittington emphasizes elsewhere that the New Originalism is focused less on 
judicial restraint than on articulating a positive vision of the constitutional rights that judges 
should promote, and that it has concomitantly deemphasized the countermajoritarian 
problem facing judicial review. See Whittington, supra note 8.  Nevertheless, he generally 
advocates construction by the political branches, just as a number of more traditional 
originalists “have converged on the prescription that constitutional ambiguities mandate 
judicial deference to ‘current democratic majorities’ and, therefore, judicial abstinence.” 
Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism:  Lessons from the Spending 
Power, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 495, 499 (2009). 
 36. WHITTINGTON, supra note 20, at 6. 
 37. Id. at 218. 
 38. BALKIN, supra note 23, at 320. 
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constitutionalism while allowing adjustments in interpretation over time in 
the face of sustained democratic mobilization.”39 
When originalists like Justice Scalia insisted on their method of 
interpretation as a solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty, they were 
obliged to posit the determinacy of large swaths of constitutional text in 
order to undertake judicial review in a manner they deemed democratically 
justifiable.  New Originalists have instead acknowledged a greater role for 
the ambiguity and multiplicity of constitutional meanings and, as a result, 
distinguish between interpretation and construction.  By turning to 
construction rather than interpretation, however, they have, in the process, 
discounted the significance of the contested meanings of the Constitution 
within the Founding era and neglected the import—both interpretively and 
democratically—of those contested meanings for understanding the 
Constitution in the present. 
As the following Part aims to show, an insistence on meaning as unified, 
and on the impossibility of interpreting once the postulate of unity has been 
undermined, resonates with a theory of politics emanating more from 
Thomas Hobbes’s notion of sovereignty than from other accounts of 
democracy or law.40  Adopting this vision of meaning impoverishes our 
understanding of the kind of democracy upon which our constitutional 
tradition rests and that which our Constitution itself makes possible. 
II.  DEMOCRACY AND CONTESTED MEANINGS 
Well before the Founding era, Thomas Hobbes, whose late seventeenth-
century philosophical controversies with John Locke are often seen as the 
commencement of the liberal tradition, addressed the quandary posed by the 
effort to reconcile political stability with the possibility of divergent 
interpretations.  As Philip Pettit has argued in Made with Words:  Hobbes 
on Language, Mind, and Politics,41 for Hobbes, the human capacity to 
employ language both creates and solves man’s fundamental problem.42  
According to Pettit’s summary: 
Although human beings are born in animal quietude, the invention of 
words leads them into inevitable strife, putting them at motivational 
loggerheads and making it impossible for them to agree on any common, 
normative currency for the regulation of their affairs.  But the invention of 
 
 39. Id. at 327–28. 
 40. The status of democracy in Hobbes’s own work has been hotly contested; although 
many have associated him with a defense of monarchy that is incompatible with democracy, 
scholars like Richard Tuck have recently made strong cases that Hobbes’s theories hold 
important implications for our democracy.  Hence, Tuck argues that Hobbes sets forth an 
influential account of “despotic democracy.” See Richard Tuck, Hobbes and Democracy, in 
RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 171, 171–90 (Annabel 
Brett, James Tully & Holly Hamilton-Bleakley eds., 2006).  Whether or not Hobbes is 
viewed as a democratic theorist is less significant for the purposes of this Article than is the 
despotic quality of the political arrangement he describes. 
 41. PHILIP PETTIT, MADE WITH WORDS:  HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND POLITICS 
(2009). 
 42. Id. at 115. 
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words provides the solution for the very problem it creates, enabling 
human beings to enter into a contract for incorporation that creates a 
sovereign sufficiently powerful to embody the commonwealth:  “that 
great Leviathan,” “that Mortal God to which we owe, under the Immortal 
God, our peace and defence.”43 
While words furnish a source of conflict within the second, verbal state of 
nature, they also allow for the creation of the political contract.  The power 
and unity of the sovereign proves crucial for the stable deployment of 
language within the constituted polity, as well.  Hobbes emphasizes the 
sovereign’s role in legislating and, in particular, in implementing legislation 
that has “a constitutive as well as regulative character,”44 in other words, 
legislation that “will first introduce new terms or concepts, and so new 
possibilities of behavior, and then regulate for how these should materialize 
in social life.”45  Because no objectively correct interpretation of certain 
terms exists, 
the sovereign is to establish the conventional meanings of a range of 
terms:  not just “what is to be called right, what good, what virtue,” but 
also “what much, what little . . . what a pound, what a quart,” what even 
in deformed or premature births is to be called “a man”; in all these 
matters, as in matters of ownership, “private judgments may differ, and 
beget controversy.”46 
Under this account, language enables entrance into the social contract, but 
the very establishment of that contract entails the placement of a sovereign 
in charge of deterring interpretive controversies and settling those that arise 
despite all efforts to ward them off.  Notwithstanding his view that 
monarchy constitutes the best form of government, Hobbes purports here to 
be speaking in more general terms of all political forms.47 
Put this way, Hobbes’s account of the relation between language and 
sovereignty bears a substantial resemblance to originalist justifications of 
judicial review in the face of the countermajoritarian difficulty.  If one 
substitutes “Constitution” for “legislation” in Pettit’s account of Hobbes, 
the sovereign’s duty becomes that of establishing a Constitution, then 
ensuring the fixity of the meaning of its terms.  Under a conventional 
originalist account, that would entail having “the people” (as sovereign) 
ratify the Constitution, then appointing a Supreme Court as the people’s 
transtemporal sovereign representative in announcing authoritative 
interpretations of the Constitution.  Sovereignty here is intimately bound up 
with the insistence on determinate meaning. 
 
 43. Id. (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 17, para. 13 (Edwin Curley ed., 
Hackett Pub. Co. 1994) (1651)). 
 44. Id. at 130. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 131 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, HUMAN NATURE AND DE CORPORE POLITICO:  
THE ELEMENTS OF LAW, NATURAL AND POLITIC ch. 29, para. 8 (Oxford Univ. Press 1994) 
(1651)). 
 47. Id. at 110. 
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An alternative position might entail viewing such a forceful sovereign as 
unnecessary once the relevant legislation or Constitution were put in place, 
because the meaning of its terms should not be subject to such deep 
contestation.  On this account, the “private judgments” that might cause 
controversy would simply constitute erroneous interpretations, errors that 
would be apparent to the vast majority of observers.  Hobbes was, however, 
concerned not simply with individuals’ deviant “private judgments,” but 
also with more thoroughgoing divergences of meaning, particularly those 
insisted upon by his early seventeenth-century adversary, Sir Edward Coke.  
As Hobbes recognized in his A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a 
Student of the Common Laws of England, Coke’s writings posed a 
substantial challenge to the political unification of meaning by positing a 
specialized understanding of those trained in the “artificial reason” of the 
common law.48  Different degrees of expertise might undergird varying 
versions of particular terms. 
Rendered in originalist terms, this issue appears as that of the “division of 
linguistic labor,” which Lawrence Solum has artfully unpacked.49  Those 
opposing a Hobbesian solution might argue, in accordance with this 
division of linguistic meaning, that specialized terms should simply carry 
their specialized meaning.  This appears to be the answer to which 
Whittington appeals, asserting that “legal writing, of which the Constitution 
is an example for the judiciary, is more contextualized than the literary 
writing around which indeterminacy theories developed.”50  Here the 
existence of specialized meanings not only poses no impediment to 
constitutional interpretation, but further limits the possibilities for 
ambiguity within constitutional provisions. 
As I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere, however, recourse to 
specialized meanings and, in particular, common law meanings of 
constitutional terms, does not, in many instances, settle the Founding-era 
import of various constitutional clauses.51  Those in different states had 
disparate understandings of what it might mean for an accused to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, as the Sixth Amendment 
 
 48. See THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND STUDENT OF THE 
COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 54–57 (Joseph Cropsey ed., Univ. of Chi. 1971) (1681). 
 49. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 8, at 34–35 (“[T]here are some words and phrases in the 
Constitution that seem to have technical meanings.  For example, it might be the case that 
the phrase letters of marque and reprisal would have been familiar to seamen, officials, and 
admiralty lawyers but almost unknown to the general public.  If this is the case, it might 
seem that this provision lacks public meaning.  To solve this problem, we can borrow an idea 
from the philosophy of language, which recognizes that the meaning of some words and 
phrases is conveyed via the division of linguistic labor.  Thus a Massachusetts farmer who 
encountered the phrase letters of marque and reprisal might say ‘That sounds like a term of 
art.  I’d better consult a lawyer or judge if I want to know what it means.’”).  For a more 
technical discussion of the division of linguistic labor, see also Lawrence B. Solum, 
Semantic Originalism 56–58 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Papers Series, Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
 50. WHITTINGTON, supra note 34, at 90. 
 51. See generally Meyler, supra note 1. 
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requires, or what “equity” connoted within the text of the Seventh 
Amendment.  If one accepts that these disparate individuals ratified a text 
interpreted according to their own assumptions about its connotations, one 
would imagine a Constitution that meant different things to different 
people, even at the time of the Founding.  This originary contestation about 
meaning is consistent not with a unified “We the People,” or even a 
majoritarian account, but instead with a fundamentally contestatory notion 
of the democratic foundations of the Constitution.  The divisions within 
democracy rather than consensus or majority rule are foregrounded by 
bringing forward and emphasizing contested original meanings. 
The resistance to accepting these aspects of original meaning derives in 
part from the dominant models of democracy that inform the 
countermajoritarian difficulty and the originalist responses—those of 
majoritarianism or of a Rousseauvian vision of “the people”—formulated in 
response to the majoritarian emphasis.  Taking the long view of democracy, 
the focus on majorities seems less inevitable.  Certainly, as a number of 
critics have recently reminded us, decision by lot seemed more central to 
the ancient conception of democracy than an idea of election.52  While we 
might resist the notion—except in the context of juries—that aleatory 
processes should represent a central component of our democratic vision, 
the principle of selection by lot should remind us that the notion of majority 
rule does not have to be integral to a conception of democracy.  Displacing 
focus away from majoritarianism allows instead for the emergence of the 
significance of contestation within democracy. 
Along these lines, Chantal Mouffe has proposed an “agonistic” 
(adversary oriented)—as opposed to “antagonistic” (enemy oriented)—
account of modern democracy.  This account would not attempt to reconcile 
what she deems the paradoxical relation of democracy and liberalism, as 
Rawlsian theory or Habermasian deliberative democracy do, but instead to 
acknowledge it.  As Mouffe contends: 
 One of the keys to the thesis of agonistic pluralism is that, far from 
jeopardizing democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its very 
condition of existence.  Modern democracy’s specificity lies in the 
recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by 
imposing an authoritarian order.  Breaking with the symbolic 
representation of society as an organic body—which was characteristic of 
 
 52. See, e.g., JACQUES RANCIÈRE, HATRED OF DEMOCRACY 40 (2006) (explaining that the 
“scandal” of Athenian democracy lies in “the choice of the god of chance, the drawing of 
lots, i.e., the democratic procedure by which a people of equals decides the distribution of 
places”); Oliver Dowlen, The Modern Revival of an Old Idea, in SORTITION:  THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 3, 3–4 (Gil Delannoi & Oliver Dowlen eds., 2010) (“[S]ortition [or] the use of 
random selection . . . in the public or political arena to choose people or allocate goods . . . 
may be new to today’s politics but was systematically used in Ancient Athens and in late 
medieval Italy—two formative periods in the development of what we know as politics or 
the political process—and in many other places besides.”). 
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the holist mode of social organization—a democratic society 
acknowledges the pluralism of values.53 
The key to moving from antagonism to agonism consists in the 
identification of “adversaries,” “the opponent with whom one shares a 
common allegiance to the democratic principles of ‘liberty and equality for 
all,’ while disagreeing about their interpretation.”54  Crucial to the 
construction of an adversary relationship is each participant’s act of 
refraining from “put[ting] into question the legitimacy of their opponent’s 
right to fight for the victory of their position.”55 
Within an agonistic system, reconciliation remains impossible, yet the 
presence of irreducible pluralism must not frustrate action.  Hence the 
moment of decision becomes crucial for Mouffe—a decision that does not 
represent a final and unquestionable verdict but a provisional step.  Mouffe 
writes that 
to institute an order, frontiers need to be drawn and the moment of closure 
must be faced.  But this frontier is the result of a political decision; it is 
constituted on the basis of a particular we/they, and for that very reason it 
should be recognized as something contingent and open to contestation.56 
The practice of agonism means, for Mouffe, that “the specificity of modern 
pluralist democracy—even a well-ordered one—does not reside in the 
absence of domination and of violence but in the establishment of a set of 
institutions through which they can be limited and contested.”57  Under her 
account, however, these institutions do not seem to include a constitution.  
Furthermore, Mouffe objects to the privileging of the juridical sphere, 
deeming this phenomenon a symptom of “the growing impossibility of 
envisaging the problems of society in a properly political way.”58  Hence, 
the requisite decision must take place outside the judicial arena. 
Despite this dismissal of the judicial in favor of the political, Mouffe 
furnishes no reasons why agonistic democracy could not be practiced in the 
area of constitutionalism itself.  Indeed, a work she relies on extensively in 
elaborating her conception of democracy—James Tully’s Strange 
Multiplicity—itself considers constitutional systems rather than politics per 
 
 53. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 103 (2000) [hereinafter MOUFFE, 
PARADOX]; see also CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS:  THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY 1-
18 (2013) [hereinafter MOUFFE, AGONISTICS]. 
 54. MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 53, at 7. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 17. 
 57. MOUFFE, PARADOX, supra note 53, at 22.  Mouffe writes similarly in Agonostics:  
Thinking the World Politically: 
  A pluralist perspective informed by the agonistic approach . . . recognizes that 
divergences can be at the origin of conflicts, but it asserts that those conflicts 
should not necessarily lead to a “clash of civilizations.”  It suggests that the best 
way to avoid such a situation is the establishment of a multipolar institutional 
framework that would create the conditions for those conflicts to manifest 
themselves as agonistic confrontations between adversaries, instead of taking the 
form of antagonistic struggles between enemies. 
MOUFFE, AGONISTICS, supra note 53, at 41. 
 58. MOUFFE, PARADOX, supra note 53, at 115. 
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se.59  Tully invokes the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein to suggest that the 
contestation at the heart of constitutionalism derives from a constitutive 
feature of language and fatally undermines modern constitutional theory’s 
quest for uniformity.  According to Tully, “[T]he language of 
constitutionalism . . . is a labyrinth of terms and their uses from various 
periods,” with an “irreducible multiplicity of concrete usage.”60  The 
analysis of language that Tully finds in Wittgenstein he connects with that 
of the common law.  As he writes, 
 Since the practical form of reasoning Wittgenstein describes is akin to 
the reasoning in individual cases at the common law, . . . it is not 
surprising that similar arguments were presented by one of the greatest 
common lawyers, Chief Justice Matthew Hale, against one of the 
founding theorists of modern constitutionalism, Thomas Hobbes.61 
Here we return full circle to the debate between Hobbes and the common 
lawyers over the nature of language and its significance for the polity. 
While Tully highlights the significance of linguistic contestation in the 
constitutional context, he concentrates largely on the capacity of different 
identity groups to achieve recognition rather than on the act of 
interpreting constitutional language.  Reading constitutional provisions as 
fundamentally contested could, however, allow for the judicial opening of a 
more general public conversation about the Constitution, one that would 
encourage an agonistic model of democracy to flourish.  In particular, 
focusing on the original contestation over meaning in the constitutional 
context reveals the extent to which agonism does not simply represent a 
newer feature of our constitutional system, but has been entrenched within 
it from the beginning.  Furthermore, uncovering the variant Founding-era 
significations of constitutional clauses takes seriously the notion that the 
Constitution actually says something; rather than simply envisioning the 
Constitution as a framework for ongoing agonistic discussion, it permits 
consideration of the Constitution as a repository of meanings.  This could 
only be the case, however, if the diversity of Founding era meanings did not 
undermine the very possibility that the Constitution could mean anything at 
all, the claim addressed by the following Part. 
 
 59. See id. at 60–77 (endorsing Tully’s reliance on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein to 
understand the agonistic role of language within the polity); JAMES TULLY, STRANGE 
MULTIPLICITY:  CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 103–15 (1995) [hereinafter 
TULLY, MULTIPLICITY] (elaborating how a Wittgensteinian approach to language practices 
can assist in moving beyond what Tully criticizes as the “uniformity” of modern 
constitutionalism); see also 1 JAMES TULLY, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY:  
DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL FREEDOM 135–59 (2008) [hereinafter TULLY, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY] 
(espousing his own version of agonism in a chapter on “[t]he agonistic freedom of citizens”). 
 60. TULLY, MULTIPLICITY, supra note 59, at 104–05; see also 1 TULLY, PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 59, at 39–70 (explaining how Wittgenstein’s account of language 
demonstrates the flaws both in Jürgen Habermas’s efforts to “establish a framework of 
argument that is itself beyond argumentation” and in Charles Taylor’s reliance on 
interpretation as “the essential feature of personhood” and provides an alternative means for 
moving forward through critical reflection). 
 61. TULLY, MULTIPLICITY, supra note 59, at 113. 
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III.  THE MEANING OF CONTESTED MEANINGS 
A number of theorists who espouse intentionalist positions on 
constitutional interpretation contend that the demonstrated existence of 
disparate intentions underwriting a constitutional clause would fatally 
undermine the possibility of the relevant language meaning anything.62  
Hence, Whittington claims, “To the extent that the founders could 
genuinely not achieve a common understanding as to the meaning of 
particular textual provisions, these provisions must necessarily remain 
meaningless.”63  Similarly, Richard Kay writes, 
While there are aspects of constitution-making that complicate the 
inquiry—such as the relatively large number of individuals and the need 
for the concurrence of more than one group—the basic idea is still valid.  
Without a core of identical meanings shared by all those agreeing, the 
concept of decision by majority is meaningless.64 
Whereas Whittington asserts as a matter of meaning itself that a lack of 
common understanding would vitiate signification, Kay bases his account 
of the deficit of enforceable meaning on the majoritarian principle 
underpinning the authority of the Constitution.  Despite the connections 
between the two arguments, they can be disaggregated; while the former 
relies on a theoretical position concerning interpretation, the latter depends 
on a proposition about legitimacy.  As contentions about democracy and 
legitimacy have already been addressed, this Part will take up Whittington’s 
arguments stemming from the philosophy of language.  Although I believe 
there are reasons to endorse an original public meaning rather than an 
intentionalist version of originalism, this Part focuses on the intentionalist 
account since it has furnished the most full-throated denunciation of the 
possibility of multiple original meanings.  Even under an intentionalist 
view, the existence of several different intended meanings of a particular 
constitutional provision should not render that portion of the Constitution 
meaningless.  Regardless of which of the two principal originalist 
interpretive postures one adopts, or of whether one believes that the 
Constitution means what its authors intended or what its original readers 
would have understood, there is no reason rooted in interpretive theory why 
several meanings cannot coexist. 
Many of the recent revivals of an intentionalist position in the literary 
and legal contexts can be traced back to E.D. Hirsch, Jr.’s Validity in 
Interpretation.65  For Hirsch, resort to intention becomes necessary 
 
 62. This critique was first articulated by Paul Brest in his classic article, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).  There, 
Brest identified many of the difficulties of attributing a unified intent to the adopters of the 
Constitution. Id. at 214–17.  The problems that Brest diagnosed furnished some of the 
impetus for movement from an “original understanding” to an “original meaning” approach 
to originalist constitutional interpretation. See Solum, supra note 8, at 9. 
 63. WHITTINGTON, supra note 34, at 96. 
 64. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 708 (2009). 
 65. E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967). 
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precisely because unmoored textual interpretation will lead to an 
indeterminacy of meaning.  He states that “if the meaning of a text is not 
the author’s, then no interpretation can possibly correspond to the meaning 
of the text, since the text can have no determinate or determinable 
meaning.”66  Elaborating upon this point, Hirsch claims that “no mere 
sequence of words can represent an actual verbal meaning with reference to 
public norms alone.  Referred to these alone, the text’s meaning remains 
indeterminate.”67  Only when “we . . . posit a speaker who very likely 
means something . . . . does the most usual sense of the word sequence 
become the most probable or ‘obvious’ sense.”68  At the same time, Hirsch 
is careful to specify what the indeterminacy to be avoided consists in and 
what it does not.  While ambiguity may be and frequently is inherent in the 
meaning of a complicated literary object like a poem, indeterminacy 
“denies the self-identity of verbal meaning by suggesting that the meaning 
of the text can be one thing and also another, different thing, and also 
another.”69 
Hirsch presents as an example the relation between several different 
critics’ interpretations of Wordsworth’s poem, A Slumber Did My Spirit 
Seal.70  While what he calls an “inclusivist” might try to reconcile these 
possible readings and the meanings they suggest, meanings rendered 
plausible by the ambiguity of the poem itself, failure to determine the 
poem’s “relative emphasis” of these meanings constitutes an interpretive 
flaw.71  On Hirsch’s account, the two readings are not reconcilable, but 
wrong, because each neglects the other; the effort to meld them is 
inadequate because “[t]he submeanings of a text are not blocks which can 
be brought together additively . . . . [s]ince verbal . . . meaning is a structure 
of component meanings.”72  A poem’s ambiguity allows for analysis of its 
respective meanings and their order of priority, whereas those positing a 
poem’s indeterminacy separate out its meanings as if they bore no structural 
relation to each other.73 
Despite resuscitating much of Hirsch’s emphasis on the intentionality of 
meaning, Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels’s essay, The 
 
 66. E.D. Hirsch, Jr., In Defense of the Author, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION 11, 14 
(Gary Iseminger ed., 1995). 
 67. Id. at 17. 
 68. Id. at 17–18. 
 69. Id. at 15. 
 70. Id. at 19. 
 71. Id. at 20–21. 
 72. Id. at 21. 
 73. Gary Iseminger has attempted more recently to rescue Hirsch’s claims about 
indeterminacy from various critiques, contending that these claims must rest on an 
ontological rather than an epistemological basis.  For Iseminger, contrary to Hirsch’s 
apparent position, an author’s will is not required to ensure the determinacy of a poem but 
instead that “[i]ndeterminacy could be resolved . . . by a random process.” Gary Iseminger, 
An Intentional Demonstration?, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 66, at  76, 
84.  Insisting upon the author as guarantor of the determinacy of a poem entails an 
ontological claim that does not involve “find[ing] out which of . . . two contradictory 
statements about [a] poem is true” but rather “claims to tell us what makes the true one true.” 
Id. at 85. 
2013] ACCEPTING CONTESTED MEANINGS 821 
Impossibility of Intentionless Meaning, criticizes Hirsch for “imagining a 
moment of interpretation before intention is present,” or “the moment at 
which the text’s meaning ‘remains indeterminate,’ before such 
indeterminacy is cleared up by the addition of authorial intention.”74  
Instead, endorsing the work of those philosophers of language who, like 
John Searle, insist that “there is no getting away from intentionality,”75 they 
maintain that meaning only inheres in intentional utterances; “to deprive 
[textual marks] of an author is to convert them into accidental likenesses of 
language.  They are not, after all, an example of intentionless meaning; as 
soon as they become intentionless they become meaningless as well.”76  
The search for meaning simply is, for them, the search for intention, and 
“[t]he issue of determinacy or indeterminacy is irrelevant.”77 
Nevertheless, the problem of indeterminacy returns for many of those 
following in Knapp and Michaels’s path, particularly when they confront 
the collective dimension of constitutional authorship.78  In several places, 
Stanley Fish has addressed the issue briefly, distinguishing, like Hirsch, 
between ambiguity and indeterminacy and allowing for the former as a 
feature of authorial intention.  As Fish writes: 
In [certain] instances, ambiguity would be produced, not by the language 
but by the intentional context within which it was encountered.  It is no 
paradox to say that those ambiguities (like the ambiguities of modern 
poetry) would be perfectly straightforward; they would capture what the 
text precisely means.  As Steven Smith observes, “legislators may 
sometimes choose to be deliberately ambiguous or vague, but they will 
communicate their favored ambiguity as precisely as possible,” for “they 
 
 74. Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, The Impossibility of Intentionless Meaning, 
in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 66, at 53. 
 75. Id. at 54. 
 76. Id. at 55. 
 77. Id. at 53. 
 78. It is worth noting here that some of those who believe that meaning must be 
intentional depart from the view that the relevant meaning is that with which the author 
endows the text.  Richard Shusterman argues that 
even if we deny with Knapp and Michaels that “there can in fact be intentionless 
meanings” and accept their premise that texts seen as “intentionless . . . become 
meaningless as well” and thus that in some sense “what is intended and what is 
meant are identical,” it still does not follow that “the meaning of a text is simply 
identical to the author’s intended meaning.”  All that follows is that the meaning of 
a text is inseparable from some intention (or group of intentions) or another.  But 
the necessary meaning-securing intentions could belong to readers of the text 
rather than to its original author. 
Richard Shusterman, Interpretation, Intention, and Truth, in INTENTION AND 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 66, at 67 (quoting Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, 
Against Theory, in AGAINST THEORY 12, 15–17 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985)).  Similarly, 
even the return to the connection between determinacy and intention does not preclude a 
reception-based account of the determinacy-supplying intents.  According to Jerrold 
Levinson:  “The determinacy in question, I would maintain, can just as easily and reasonably 
come from an audience’s best contextually informed hypothesis of authorial intention in a 
given passage, all things considered.” Jerrold Levinson, Intention and Interpretation:  A Last 
Look, in INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 66, at 221, 236. 
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will want the courts and the public to have the blessing and burden of 
their preferred ambiguity, not somebody else’s ambiguity.”79 
Both Fish’s and Smith’s descriptions of ambiguity here assume the unity of 
intent, whether poetic or legislative.  The situation would be different if it 
could be demonstrated that a particular group of legislators—or drafters of 
the Constitution—endorsed one meaning of a provision, whereas another 
group thought it carried quite a different signification, and neither 
constituency agreed on the ambiguity (at least explicitly) as a means of 
agreeing to disagree.  This situation is a common one, as Jeremy Waldron 
notes in The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review:  “[T]he bland 
rhetoric of the Bill of Rights was designed simply to finesse the real and 
reasonable disagreements that are inevitable among people who take rights 
seriously for long enough to see such a Bill enacted.”80  Although 
Waldron’s use of “design” could imply a general intent among the 
Constitution’s authors to enshrine ambiguity, it could also entail a less 
intentional putting aside of disagreement simply to facilitate consensus on 
general language about which most could concur. 
In another essay, Fish addresses this problem rather cursorily, simply 
claiming that any disparity in intentions among the authors of a collectively 
created document results in the existence of several texts rather than a 
single one.  Hence, he inquires: 
[S]uppose different legislators meant something different by the words of 
the legislation—the word was “canard” and some were voting for “ducks” 
and others for “false stories.”  What then?  Well, as J.L. Austin might say, 
that is an infernal shame, for then you would have two texts and two 
meanings and no way of reducing them to one, and you would have to 
figure out another way to proceed.  This, however, would be an unusual 
instance; in most cases a multiauthored text presents no particular 
problem to interpreters.81 
The concluding casual dismissal of the problems arising from the task of 
assessing the meaning of a multiauthored text quickly puts aside the 
significant puzzles propounded by game and public choice theorists and 
others who have—largely in the legislative rather than the constitutional 
context—questioned the viability of an intentional account of the meaning 
of collectively produced documents.82  Quite apart from this, however, 
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Fish’s account entirely ignores the significance of the fact that the authors 
have—intentionally, one might say—chosen to express themselves in one 
text. 
The consequences of this neglect emerge from his subsequent remarks on 
the single author who is not simply attempting to enhance ambiguity in her 
work, but is instead genuinely divided in intent about the work being 
created.  As Fish observes: 
 There is another possibility; not two persons with different intentions, 
but one person with different intentions. . . .  Could an author have 
contradictory intentions and employ the same words as the vehicle for 
both of them?  Sure, but in that case we would speak of an author “of two 
minds” with each of the minds producing its own text with its own 
meaning.83 
Here we arrive back at something resembling Hirsch’s example of the 
two critical takes on Wordsworth’s poem.  For Hirsch, simply adding these 
interpretations together could not produce a correct view because doing so 
would ignore the structure of the relation between meanings within the 
poem.  Acknowledging poetic ambiguity then differs from finding 
indeterminacy because in the former case the object is admitted to be 
singular whereas in the latter it can be divided into various possible texts. 
If we consider in more detail what it means to decompose the work of 
Fish’s “author ‘of two minds’” into two texts, it becomes apparent that this 
process summarily puts to one side the author’s (intentional) decision to 
present her work as unitary. 
Imagine a modification of an example that Gary Iseminger uses in his 
essay, An Intentional Demonstration?84  There Iseminger considers a letter 
in which Gerard Manley Hopkins, upon reading over his poem, expressed 
concern that it actually meant something quite different from what he had 
intended.85  Suppose that Hopkins had embraced, rather than rejected, this 
alternative—and even contrary—meaning, and decided that the poem was 
only improved by promulgation with an additional possible sense.  This 
scenario could be seen as a version of the situation in which the poet is of 
two minds, at first intending one meaning, then later endorsing another, as 
well.  The relevant analogy in the legislative or constitutional context would 
presumably consist in the conscious embrace of textual ambiguity, such as 
Joseph Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard discuss in their aptly entitled Statutes 
with Multiple Personality Disorders:  The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory 
Design and Interpretation.86  With respect to both the individual and 
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collective authors, parsing out separate texts to preserve the unity of 
intentional meaning under these circumstances seems to unjustifiably 
neglect the choice to present the work as singular, not multiple. 
The multiplicity of meanings may not itself be intended, however, when 
different constitution drafting or legislative constituencies find the 
signification of a particular phrase obvious, and yet each supplies a distinct 
“obvious” meaning.  In this case too, however, the collective decision to 
create a speech act with a certain force cannot be disregarded.  A great deal 
of ink has been spilled over the nature and reducibility of collective 
intention in the sphere of analytic philosophy, and entering fully into the 
relevant debates is not possible within the scope of this Article.87  
Nevertheless, some of the basic insights that have been elaborated in the 
area are relevant here.  Much of the discussion of collective intention bears 
most upon matters of criminal law rather than those of constitutional or 
legislative interpretation, as the focus remains on group activity instead of 
the documents or meanings generated out of such activity.  Hence, in 
elaborating on the existence of collective intention, John Searle writes, 
It seems obvious that there really is collective intentional behavior as 
distinct from individual intentional behavior.  You can see this by 
watching a football team execute a pass play or hear it by listening to an 
orchestra.  Better still, you can experience it by actually engaging in some 
group activity in which your own actions are a part of the group action.88 
At the same time, Searle identifies collective intention as required for the 
consequences of a speech act like the Declaration of Independence.  As he 
maintains, “Full-blown cooperative collective intentionality . . . is often 
necessary for the creation of the institution.  Think of the creation of the 
United States at the time of the Declaration of Independence, for 
example.”89  The cooperative intentionality at work here achieves not just 
the production of a document, but also the creation of an institution.  This 
collective speech act differs from an individual one.  When arguing for the 
notion that “collective speech acts are really different from and irreducible 
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to individual speech acts,”90 it is precisely Searle’s category of the 
declaration—a speech act aimed at “bring[ing] about a correspondence 
between the propositional content of the speech act and reality, i.e., to make 
true in the world what is said in the content of the act”91—that Anthonie 
Meijers adduces to demonstrate that “Searle’s taxonomy [of speech acts 
may] already include[] elements of collective agency.”92  As he notes:  “A 
case in point is Searle’s category of declarations.  Though there may be 
exceptional cases of individual declarations—for example, when a speaker 
defines a term—most declarations require extralinguistic institutions and 
thus collective intentionality and collective agency.”93  Not only the 
Declaration of Independence, but the Constitution, too, performs a speech 
act.  As a declaration, it announces and implements a structured polity, 
regardless of the particular nuances of that structure.  The collective 
element of constitutional creation is crucial to the Constitution’s status as 
declaration and presupposes the possibility of collective agency. 
Although focusing on group testimony rather than on declarations, and 
on our justifications for believing such testimony instead of our 
interpretation of its meaning, Deborah Tollefsen valuably elaborates on the 
inadequacy of an account of group documentary production that relies 
simply on the summing of individual activities.  The “summative approach” 
would consider that “when a group offers testimony it is really understood 
as the testimony of all or some of the members—what they would testify to 
if given the opportunity.”94  Pointing out that the research for something 
like a United Nations Commission report may have been done by staff not 
involved in the drafting process, that some individual members might 
remain skeptical of the final results, and that particular people within the 
group may only have arrived at views on the topic at hand once they saw 
the compiled information, Tollefsen maintains that the summative approach 
cannot deal with these problems.  Instead, 
when a group testifies the source of this testimony is the group itself.  
What is required for an assertion to count as the group’s testimony is 
some form of sanction that allows an assertion to be that of the group, and 
such an assertion must occur within the proper normative context.95 
A similar set of points applies to the process of constitution making.  
Simply disaggregating the resulting document into a number of disparate 
statements by members of a constitutional convention who were unable—or 
inadvertently failed—to agree on the meaning of component terms neglects 
the sanction that renders the constitution as promulgated a product of the 
meeting, a document with a particular legal force, and a speech act intended 
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to establish a political structure.96  This speech act does not end contestation 
over particular clauses by generating either a unitary meaning or none at all, 
but instead expresses the intent of the drafters (or ratifiers) to produce a 
common polity.  Agonism left its mark on the text in the form of the 
Founding-era debates over constitutional meaning as much as social 
movements’ work to affect constitutional interpretation has brought such 
agonism to the fore today.  The agonism enshrined in the Constitution itself 
does not undermine the possibility of constitutional meaning, but instead 
demonstrates that the contestation we live with now only represents the 
most recent manifestation of a longstanding constitutional tradition. 
CONCLUSION 
New Originalists have moved beyond an insistence on determinacy 
toward advocating for constitutional construction as a supplement to 
interpretation.  In doing so, however, many have accepted the proposition 
that original meaning cannot exist in the absence of a majority Founding-
era view about what that meaning was.  This position both undervalues the 
feasibility and desirability of interpretation in light of multiple meanings 
and rests on a view of democracy that neglects the role of agonism and 
dissensus within the polity.  Recovering the contested Founding-era 
meanings of constitutional provisions instead foregrounds the possibility of 
a democracy in which the people agree to make a declaration announcing a 
constitutional structure but simultaneously acknowledge—implicitly or 
explicitly—the considerable disagreement that persists despite their joint 
project.  This, I would contend, is our democracy. 
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